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ABSTRACT
This article evaluates how tax reforms affect stock prices of local and foreign firms in Oman 
and Saudi Arabia. Both countries introduced corporate tax on foreign firms, exempting local 
firms from corporate tax, when they moved away from a pre-existing Islamic tax neutrality 
policy. These reforms were implemented in 2009 in Oman and in 2004 in Saudi Arabia. 
These tax reform events – applying to foreign firms and not applying to local firms in the 
same markets – offer ideal experimental situations in two economies to test the taxation 
theories on how stock prices must react. We find that the results support the Modigliani-
Miller and Elton-Gruber tax theories in two ways. Firstly, foreign firms that had their taxes 
reduced experienced stock price increases. Secondly, local firms not subjected to tax or tax 
reduction showed no visible tax effect. These are theory-consistent findings in the unique 
tax environments in these two Islamic countries, which moved away from tax neutrality, 
enabling us to obtain very clear evidence on modern theories of taxation. In our view, this 
evidence is significantly important addition to the literature on tax and taxation and for 
those contemplating a move away from Islamic tax neutrality.
Keywords: Corporate tax reform, Islamic tax-neutrality policy, announcement effect, corporation incomes, 
ex-dividend days
INTRODUCTION
This article has two objectives: measuring 
stock price changes when corporate tax 
laws changed in two Islamic countries, 
moving away from tax neutrality to modern 
taxation practices). Prior to this reform, 
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both countries had entrenched tax rules that 
did not tax any incomes of corporations or 
individuals. The second aim is to verify if 
stock price changes are consistent with the 
dividend tax effect theories in finance and 
financial economics. With the practice of 
traditional Islamic tax neutrality, historically 
both countries uniquely did not also have 
dividend and capital gains taxes nor 
corporate or income taxes until a very high 
corporate tax was imposed in some time 
back but only on foreign firms (Jalili, 2006). 
In recent years, taking cognition of low 
rates of corporate taxes in most countries, 
Oman first and Saudi Arabia later reduced 
the tax rates substantially. These corporate 
tax reduction events in these two countries 
have yet to be studied despite the events 
offering unique situations for testing tax 
theories. The two taxation theories to be 
explained in this paper predict that asset 
prices are insensitive to specific tax laws 
if there is no tax on taxable incomes and if 
there is no change. These countries provide 
an ideal experimental situation as their 
reforms changed Islamic tax neutrality 
by introducing corporate tax only on 
corporations before-tax income while not 
taxing the dividend incomes accruing to 
shareholders with no capital gains tax in 
both cases.
These two countries have previously 
implemented progressive corporate tax 
rates only on foreign firms mainly to gather 
revenue from non-domestic firms: note 
that, under tax neutrality, the domestic 
firm’s incomes were not taxed. Local 
firms enjoyed no corporate tax as had been 
historically practised under Islamic tax 
neutrality. Besides this, these countries have 
vast revenues to conduct their government 
functions without imposing any corporate 
tax on local firms. We analysed the effect 
of an unexpected change in the tax policy, 
which was a reduction in the corporate 
tax rate on foreign firms while preserving 
tax neurality for individuals and locally-
owned firms. Under taxation theories, tax 
reductions or tax eliminations (as in the case 
of the Bush-Obama laws during 2003 and 
2012: see Aslam et al., 2012) are viewed 
as conveying good news by investors in 
foreign-owned firms, hence stock prices are 
expected to rise.
In Oman, corporate income tax was 
introduced in 1981 for all firms; nevertheless, 
it was immediately amended to provide 
exemption for local firms, so under Islamic 
tax neutrality, there was no tax levied on 
local firms. The exemption for local firms 
was lifted in 1993, where local corporate 
income was taxed at between 5 to 30 %, 
with a maximum rate of 50 % for foreign 
firms. Our concern was with foreign firms 
experiencing large falls in tax rates from 50 
to 12 %. In 2009, the government introduced 
a flat reduced tax rate for all firms, including 
domestic firms, to 12 %, as in the case of 
China, which did a similar reform in 2005. 
The new tax law took effect on 1 January 
2010: a reduction was considered good news 
for all firms, both local and foreign. Local 
firms had their tax reduced from a maximum 
of 30 to 12 % while the foreign firms had 
their taxes reduced from 50 % to 12 %; 
the latter is obviously noteworthy. Also, in 
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Oman there were the same zero dividend 
incomes and capital gains taxes. This new 
income tax law only affected corporations. 
Individuals were not subject to taxation on 
any income. 
In Saudi Arabia, the imposition of 
corporate tax of foreign firms was made 
even earlier, in the 1950s: the rate varied 
from 25 to 45 % of corporate pre-tax 
incomes. The tax did not apply to firms 
with local ownership, unlike in Oman. 
Furthermore, oil investment firms were 
required to pay a tax rate of 85 %, which 
is an oil-royalty-type payment. After some 
pressure from foreign firms and international 
organisations, the Saudi government gave 
serious consideration to lowering the tax 
rate. In 2003 (also moving away from 
historical tax neutrality), after considerable 
debate, the new law reduced the tax rate 
to 25 %, which is a substantial change, 
and this was good news for foreign firms. 
Nevertheless, the Crown Prince through a 
royal edict managed to push the rate even 
lower to 20 % at the time of signing the law 
into effect on 15 August 2004.
The rest of the paper is divided into 
three more sections. Section 2 is a very brief 
statement on relevant tax theories, while the 
methodology is explained in section 3. The 
results are presented thereafter in section 4 
with a short conclusion found in section 5. 
The overall result affirmed the predictions of 
the two tax theories and is explained in the 
next section: the ideal environment provides 
a clean test situation.
BRIEF REVIEW OF TAX LITERATURE
Our research is rooted in the well-known 
literature of Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
on corporate taxation and the announcement 
effect studies that abound in finance 
literature. This theory suggests that when 
there is no tax of any kind, as in Islamic 
tax neutrality, a firm’s value is invariant to 
debt funding. That is, there would be no tax 
advantage in acquiring either debt or equity. 
Hence, any combination of securities as 
equity or debt (say sukuk debt under Islamic 
laws) is as good as any other combination. 
This could be written as:
L UV V= , if 0cτ =   Eq. (1)
where the value of levered firm (VL) is 
equal to the value of unlevered firm (VU) 
when corporate tax does not exist with no 
tax-deductibility of interest payments (sukuk 
dividends). That is, with tax neutrality for 
local firms in these two Islamic nations, tax 
should not affect domestic stock prices in 
our two cases although foreign firms would 
be affected by tax laws. Unlike in most 
developed and developing countries, there 
is also no capital gains nor is there personal 
income taxation under tax neutrality. Thus, if 
tax is introduced in Oman and Saudi Arabia 
on foreign firms only, only those firms in 
the share market should react to the news as 
foreign firms in Saudi Arabia are the only 
ones that had tax reduced in 2003, which 
was good news. This is a unique event, so 
it deserves to be examined to investigate 
how the theory-suggested stock price effect 
would play out in this unique tax situation 
without the additional complication of 
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testing this effect in countries with dividend 
tax and capital gains tax as is the case in 
most countries practising other tax policies.
Nevertheless, it must be recorded here 
that the value of levered and unlevered 
firms would be different if corporate tax 
were imposed ( 0cτ ≠ ) as per a revision 
to the above theory by the same authors 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963), hereafter MM. 
The value of the levered firm would increase 
by the amount of tax deduction on interest 
payment, which is sourced from debts. This 
theory, while not tested in this paper, is very 
much so worth studying in detail. 
Taxation effect can also be observed 
from the ex-dividend day share price 
behaviour since investors price stocks on the 
basis of “after-tax” dividend flows if there 
are dividend tax and capital gains tax. In 
both our markets, these taxes are set to zero 
under tax neutrality. It is widely observed 
that price would generally decline around an 
ex-date since payment of dividends on the 
ex-date is cash outflow. Elton and Gruber 
(1970) outlined a basic model to measure 
average share price decline  where both 
these taxes are implemented:
The calculation is derived from an 
equilibrium equation that implies investors’ 
indifference towards dividends or capital 
gains from selling stocks when dividend tax 
and capital gains tax are the same. Referring 
to the above equation, the changes in share 
price before ex-date (PB) and after ex-date 
(PA) is reflected in the difference in dividend 
and capital gains tax, provided no arbitrage. 
This is a relevant theory for testing if the tax 
effect is zero as in our two cases given the 
unique situation that there is no capital gains 
and dividend tax.
Nevertheless, the theory has drawn 
some criticism. Some researchers have 
acknowledged that the price drop is due to 
short term arbitrage (Kalay, 1982; 1984) and 
also to the microstructure effect on prices, or 
that the drop is associated with the market 
frictions such as price-discreteness and 
bid-ask bounce (Bali & Hite, 1998; Frank 
& Jagannathan,1998; Dubofski, 1992). 
However, these explanations are mostly 
irrelevant to our investigation as in our 
study, capital gains and dividend taxes were 
zero. Therefore, it is important to conduct 
research in a tax-controlled environment 
such as that in Saudi Arabia and Oman.
  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Two basic methods were employed to 
pursue the research objectives: (1) event 
study method on corporate tax event 
announcement effects, and (2) measurement 
of the average share price decline on the ex-
dividend date. MM’s theory would suggest 
that the value of the firm would have to go 
up if corporations paid less tax: see Eq. (1). 
As per Eq. (2), the stock price decline ratio 
at the time of ex-dividend days should be 
equal to the amount of dividends, so that the 
ratio of dividend-to-stock price is equal to 1. 
The well-entrenched event study method 
was applied as outlined by MacKinlay 
(1997) to investigate the impact of the 
1
1
pB A
cg
P P
Div
τ
τ
−−
=
−
Eq. (2)
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announcement effect. Event dates were 
selected from the formal announcement 
by the government that was found in news 
available from Factiva database. This was 
due to a lack of English news publications 
available, especially in the early 1990s. The 
news report also confirmed the available law 
report found on the government website. The 
firms’ data were collected from Datastream, 
a database provided by Thomson-Reuters. 
The database includes adjusted share 
price, main index price, dividend yield, 
firm capitalisation and debt-to-equity ratio. 
Also, to estimate the expected return, we 
applied the widely used market model 
method (MacKinlay, 1997). Results were 
then validated through computation of t-test 
to see whether the announcement provided 
a significant impact across event windows 
(Brown & Warner, 1984). 
The second measurement was the 
average price decline on the ex-dividend 
day. We applied the classic Elton-Gruber 
(1970) model to measure this tax effect: 
If personal tax on dividends (numerator) is 
zero along with capital gains tax also being 
zero, the stock price drop to dividend ratio 
must be equal to 1, as the term on the right-
hand side reduces to 1.00. The average price 
decline is expected to be 1 or significantly 
not different from 1, since the dividend tax 
rate is equal to the capital gains tax rate. 
Bell and Jenkinson’s (2002) method is also 
conducted as a way of verifying the results 
through OLS (Ordinary Least Square) 
regression:
Deriving the equation from the Elton-
Gruber model, the average price drop ratio 
could also be estimated from the slope 
coefficient in the regression. Corrections 
for heteroskedasticity were carried out using 
the Newey-West (1987) method and we 
also allowed for non-zero intercept as this 
would avoid biased estimates of the slope 
coefficient. 
EVIDENCE OF TAX EFFECT ON 
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF TAX RATE 
REVISIONS
 Announcement Effect on Foreign Firms
In this section, we present the findings of 
the announcement effect measurements: 
see summary test statistics in Table 1 and 2. 
It must be noted that the windows we 
used were short windows as is the practice in 
such studies; later we widened the windows, 
which yielded different numbers. It was 
found that the announcement of changes to 
the corporate tax laws had a positive effect 
on the portfolio of foreign firms. 
In the case of Oman, the portfolio of 
foreign firms showed a highly positive 
significant price effect measured as 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAAR) around the issuance dates of the 
law on 1 June, 2009.
1
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The local firms with no tax effect from 
being excluded from tax did not have any 
significant tax effect: CAAR (-1 to 0) is 
0.306 % with no significant t-value. The 
foreign stocks gained a 18.159 % gain 
since these firms would have a significant 
reduction in tax payments from 50 % 
reduced to 12 %. In the literature on tax 
effect, this is perhaps the largest CAAR 
observed in any country. The tax effect 
Event Date  -1 to 0 0 to +1  -1 to +1 Others
25/5/2009 Foreign 18.159 1.462 1.570
Law passed (4.565)** (0.363) (0.318)
Local 0.306 1.269 1.731
(0.124) (0.515) (0.573)
1/6/2009 Foreign -0.195 16.831 16.493 16.978 0 to +9
Law issued (-0.048) (4.382)*** (3.377)*** (1.904)*
Local
 
0.051 -0.276 -0.752 -0.178
(0.021) (-0.113) (-0.251) (-0.032)
Note: Available firm sample is 6 for foreign firms and  97 for local firms. Level of significance is 
noted with asterisks, *(0.1), **(0.05) and ***(0.01).  
TABLE 1 
Oman Foreign and Local Firms, CAARs
  -1 to 0 0 to +1 -1 to +1 Others  
5/1/2004 Foreign 0.564 0.262 0.336
Shura voting (1.351) (0.364) (0.536)
Local 0.625 -0.063 0.662
(1.212) (-0.455) (0.748)
12/1/2004 Foreign 0.476 0.636 0.590
Law passed (0.839) (1.560) (1.165)
Local 0.803 0.753 0.907
(1.622) (1.381) (1.737)*
30/7/2004 Foreign -0.953 -0.393 -1.357
Effective date (-0.976) (-0.945) (-1.601)
Local 0.319 0.7548 1.043
(1.244) (1.090) (1.720)*
15/8/2004 Foreign 1.056 1.582 3.0126 6.122  -3 to +3
Law announcement (0.585) (0.679) (1.423) (2.542)***
Local -0.068 -0.757 -0.054 2.100
  (-0.299) (-0.027) (-0.017) (1.246)
Available sample of firm is about 4 to 6 for non-Saudi owned firms and 12 to 22 for Saudi-owned firms. 
The level of significance is noted with asterisks, *(0.1), **(0.05) and ***(0.01).  
Table 2: 
Saudi Arabia Foreign-Local Portfolio CAARs
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was obvious in all but one test window for 
foreign firms. Similarly, the sample on Saudi 
Arabia firms also yielded similar stock price 
behaviour.
We found that there was one significant 
positive price reaction as measured by 
the CAAR of foreign firms around the 
announcement date of 15 August, 2004. 
The tax effect was more complicated in the 
case of Saudi Arabia. Consistent with the 
more simple situation of this tax reform, 
no local firms were affected as these firms 
had no laws changed requiring taxes to be 
reduced. So, all the tests showed that there 
was no significant tax effect in any of the 
tested windows for local firms. With no 
unexpected change in tax laws, there was no 
information effect at all for local firms. In 
the case of foreign firms, the law was pretty 
much uncertain until the Crown Prince took 
the iniative to reduce the tax rate by law. 
Hence, in the windows traditionally used 
in event studies (-1 to 0; 0 to +1; etc.) there 
was no observable impact. However, when 
the amendments to the law were done, it 
became clear there was a delayed impact in 
the period -3 to +3 test window. The CAAR 
was 6.122 %, and the t-value was significant 
at 0.01 acceptance level.  
Thus, the behaviour of local firms 
conformed to the information effect theory 
in that there was no unexpected change in 
tax rate, so there was no effect. The tax 
reform did affect only the foreign firms.
Ex-dividend Day Price Effects
As for the ex-dividend day share price 
behaviour, the calculated average price-drop 
(APD)-to-dividend ratio (using adjusted 
price and dividends) was found to be close 
to the theory-hypothesised value of 1. The 
APD value of 0.996 was not significantly 
different from 1: the test was done to see if 
the measured coefficient (0.996 in column 
2) was different from 1.00 (see Table 3.1). 
The test was done in two parts, with and 
without outlier trimming. The “adjusted” 
results were after winsorian data trimming 
for outliers 2.5 standard deviations. The 
data series with very small dividends tended 
to have an extreme APD, so winsorian 
testing was needed. The second sample 
was without outlier trimming: the results 
were misleading, so we present the results 
to justify why winsorising the observations 
was important in this research. 
The theory states that if there are no 
capital gains and personal tax, stock price 
formation should ignore any tax effect 
on the dividends, just as found for Oman. 
Note that the t-value of -0.077 was not 
significantly different from 1.00. The 
unadjusted values are shown here to indicate 
Table 3.1
Average Price Drop, Omani Firms
The table summarises the calculation of the Elton-
Gruber model of average price drop-todividend ratio. 
The calculated average price drop (APD) omits the 
outliers through winsorisation and exclusion of low 
dividend and non-trading data.
APD (Adjusted) APD (Unadjusted)
Average 0.996 2.768
N 69 112
T-value (-0.077) (5.949)***
Level of significance is noted with asterisks, *** 
(0.01).
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that the adjustment for dividend, if not done 
correctly, would have given the opposite 
result of a significant change. 
As a robustness testing, we also ran the 
Bell and Jenkinson’s model (see Eq. 3) to 
further verify the significant relationship 
between the ex-day price drop, ( )cum ex cumP P P−  
and dividend, cumDiv P .In the initial regression, 
the variable was not significant, with a 
coefficient of 0.174, which is further away 
from our hypothesis. The ratio might be a 
bit biased since the intercept was suppressed 
to zero. Nevertheless, after the intercept was 
dropped, the coefficient became significant 
with a p-value of less than 0.01, whereas 
the coefficient was 1.029 (see Table 3.2). 
It was indeed very close to our hypothesis 
ratio of 1.
The results for Saudi Arabia also 
provide similar evidence of no effect on 
stock prices on the ex-dividend days. The 
average price drop ratio was 0.994, which 
is in line with the hypothesised value of 1 
as predicted by the Elton-Gruber Model (see 
Table 4.1). Thus, this value was also not 
significantly different from 1 as shown by 
the low t-value of -0.152, that is, the pricing 
behaviour of the investors on the “after-tax 
cash flow” basis takes into account that there 
is zero capital gains and dividend tax rates 
for investors, such that the price drop was 
exactly equal to the dividends. 
It is worthwhile noting that tests on 
several countries have shown that this 
price drop ratio is significantly away from 
1.00: the ratio is 0.76 for the US in one 
study, which is what one would expect 
with an average US tax rate of about 34 % 
in that country during the test period. The 
unadjsuted numbers are not reliable, and we 
show that number to empahsise the point 
that without winsorising the observations, 
we would end up with a wrong conclusion.
Table 3.2 
Regression Analysis of Price Drop Ratio, Omani Firms
The regression refers to price-drop-to-dividend ratio during the period 2004 to 2012 using the adjusted 
price and dividend data. The last two columns are the result after the intercept was dropped. F-statistic was 
not indicated in that regression. The regression was heteroskedascticity corrected using the Newey-West 
method as provided in EViews.
C DIV/P Adj. R2 F-Stat DIV/P Adj. R2
0.068 0.174 0.034 2.700 1.029 0.513
(6.563)*** (1.377) (9.371)***
0.000 0.175 0.000
Level of significance is noted with asterisks, *** (0.01).
Table 4.1
Average Price Drop, Saudi Firms
The table summarises the calculation of Elton-
Gruber model of average price drop-to[dividend 
ratio. The calculated average price drop (APD) 
omits the outliers through winsorisation and 
exclusion of low dividend and non-trading data.
APD (Adjusted) APD 
(Unadjusted)
Average 0.994 1.505
N 159 215
T-value (-0.152) (3.572)***
Level of significance is noted with asterisks, 
* (0.10) and *** (0.01).
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Robustness testing: Using the Bell-
Jenkinson model, we ran a regression of 
the price drop variable, ( )cum ex cumP P P−  against the 
dividend, cumDiv P  (see Eq. 3). We found that 
there was a positive significant relationship 
(p-value < 0.01) indicating the relevance 
of dividends, with a coefficient value of 
0.84. After suppressing the intercept, the 
coefficient was found to be 0.969, which 
was very close to our initial hypothesised 
ratio of 1. The adjusted R-squared seemed to 
be reasonable at 0.414 and 0.405, before and 
after the intercept was dropped, respectively. 
Also, the F-statistic indicated a significant 
Table 4.2 
Regression Analysis of Price Drop Ratio, Saudi Firms
The regression refers to price drop-to-dividend ratio during the period of 2004 to 2012 using the adjusted 
price and dividend data. The last two columns are the result after the intercept was dropped. The F-statistic 
was not indicated in that regression. The regression was heteroskedascticity corrected using the Newey-
West method as provided in EViews.
C DIV/P Adj. R2 F-Stat DIV/P Adj. R2
0.005 0.840 0.414 116.891 0.969 0.405
(1.384) (7.376)*** 000.00 (13.105)***
0.168 0.000 0.000
Level of significance is noted with asterisks, *** (0.01).
Table 5
Oman Foreign and Local Portfolio AARs
1/6/2009 (Law issued)
Foreign Local
AAR T-Statistic AAR T-Statistic
-5 5.262 (1.801)* -0.156 (-0.270)
-4 -4.083 (-0.187) 1.425 (4.318)***
-3 0.215 (0.244) -0.360 (-1.064)
-2 0.571 (0.810) 0.691 (1.917)*
-1 -0.314 (-0.510) -0.476 (-1.704)*
0 0.066 (0.076) 0.527 (0.511)
+1 4.168 (0.345) -0.804 (-2.791)***
+2 -0.932 (-1.776)* -1.490 (-4.925)***
+3 -1.502 (-1.461) -2.424 (-3.650)***
+4 0.793 (0.611) 0.755 (1.896)*
+5 -0.358 (-0.242) -1.448 (-3.919)***
+6 1.449 (2.109)** -1.448 (-3.919)***
+7 0.168 (0.059) 1.083 (-0.581)
+8 1.464 (2.031)** 1.639 (5.727)***
+9 1.561 (2.203)** 0.452 (1.514)
+10 -0.523 (-0.886) -0.949 (-3.020)***
Note: Available firm sample is 20 for foreign firms and  97 for local firms. Level of significance is noted 
with asterisks, *(0.1), **(0.05) and ***(0.01).  
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goodness of fit. The summary of result is 
shown in Table 4.2.
Similar to the findings for Omani firms, 
Saudi firms also had a similar interpretation 
of tax effect on the ex-dividend days. In a 
tax-controlled environment, where dividend 
and capital gains are not taxed, the share 
prices appear to drop by the same amount 
of dividends, on average. 
AAR and Plots of the CAAR for Oman and 
Saudi Arabia
The daily AARs over the event days -5 to 
day +10 are shown in Table 5 for Oman. 
We report daily average abnormal returns 
(AARs) around announcement days for 
Oman and Saudi Arabia over -5 and +10 
days. As for the stock returns in Oman, it 
was observed that there was a mixed price 
effect around the days when the bill was 
passed into law on the 25 May, 2009. Our 
test windows were much wider than those 
used in tests discussed in the earlier section. 
The results were different owing to the 
delayed impact or lack of investor reaction 
over different stages of the bill going 
through till it was passed or amended by 
the Crown Prince (in Saudi Arabia). There 
was a large AAR of 5.2 % in the case of 
foreign firms, where change in price was a 
significant change acceptable at the p-value 
< 0.1 during the day of passing the bill. 
The local firms did not have any significant 
AAR: the AAR -0.156 %. 
The plots of the CAARs are found in 
Figure 1. There was a highly significant 
CAAR of about 5 % when the law came into 
force on 1 June, 2009. One could also note 
that the price reation of the foreign firms was 
much more prominent because these firms 
would enjoy a large cut in tax.
Daily AARs for both local and foreign 
firms are reported in Table 6.
As for Saudi Arabia, there were two 
events pertaining to the corporate tax 
changes applicable only to the foreign 
firms; the date of pasing the bill into law 
was 6 January, 2004. The issuance of the 
amended law lowering the tax rate was on 
15 August, 2004.  
Although there were positive changes 
in price indicating that the market was 
reacting to the news as good news, none of 
the individual day changes in prices were 
statistically significant. One explanation 
for this is that, under Saudi parliamentary 
(Shura) procedures, the law can be changed 
by the rulers after Parliament has passed it. 
Hence, it is possible that the investors would 
only react after the ruler had signed the law 
into effect. This is similar to the US practice 
of the President passing the law into effect. 
Hence, we would expect a delayed effect on 
the day the law came into force. However, 
it appears that the news was treated as good 
news, but there was no significant upward 
price revision as in Oman. 
Fig 1: Stock price Reactions in Oman Around Event 
Event Date: 1/6/2009 (Law issued)
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We plotted the AARs for both local and 
foreign firms’ portfolio (see Figure 2). It can 
be noted that there was a significant upward 
price change of about 3 % for foreign firms 
over the window from day -3 to +3  days 
after the ruler had passed the law into effect 
on 15 August, 2004. Thus, there was a 6.2 
% change in recognition of the ruler further 
lowering the tax rate that Parliament had 
passed, but the ruler had lowered it for 
foreign firms. It is not surprising therefore 
for this unique legal practice to have been 
the reason for the investors’ delaying their 
reaction until the ruler affirmed the tax 
Foreign Local
6/1/2004 15/8/2004 6/1/2004 15/8/2004
Bill being voted Law issued Bill being voted Law issued
AAR T-Stat AAR T-Stat AAR T-Stat AAR T-Stat
-5 -0.407 (-0.245) 0.028 (-0.022) -0.464 (-0.306) 0.299 (0.119)
-4 1.394 (0.503) 0.160 (0.142) 0.683 (0.433) -0.119 (-0.034)
-3 -0.392 (-0.222) 0.175 (0.051) -0.267 (-0.167) 0.637 (0.278)
-2 0.030 (0.093) 1.283 (0.689) 0.233 (0.131) 0.482 (0.564)
-1 0.073 (-0.007) 1.431 (0.668) 0.391 (0.198) 0.703 (0.465)
0 0.491 (0.312) -0.375 (-0.316) 0.037 (0.107) -0.771 (-0.521)
+1 -0.228 (-0.144) 1.957 (0.803) -0.100 (-0.079) 0.014 (-0.044)
+2 0.445 (0.188) 0.449 (0.028) 1.079 (0.683) 0.209 (-0.077)
+3 -0.046 (-0.254) 1.202 (0.553) 0.154 (0.004) 0.826 (0.731)
+4 0.522 (0.151) -0.926 (-0.480) 0.649 (0.437) -0.010 (0.086)
+5 0.114 (0.020) 0.053 (0.069) 0.104 (0.032) 0.806 (0.543)
+6 0.143 (0.145) -0.358 (-0.242) 1.964 (1.229) 0.018 (-0.102)
+7 -1.544 (-0.626) -0.942 (-0.549) -1.352 (-0.766) -0.290 (-0.358)
+8 -0.276 (-0.171) -0.290 (-0.158) -0.339 (-0.155) 0.807 (0.842)
+9 -0.068 (-0.001) 0.116 (0.186) 0.075 (0.036) -0.190 (-0.291)
+10 -0.412 (-0.140) -0.021 (0.344) -0.241 (-0.299) -0.934 (-0.865)
Table 6 
Saudi Foreign and Local AARs
Event Date: 12/1/2004 (Law passed) Event Date: 15/8/2004 (Law issued)
Fig 2: Stock Price Reactions in Saudi Arabia Around Tax Reform Events
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reduction with a further lowering of tax from 
24 % to 12 %. Earlier events thus went off 
without significant change to prices. The 
local firms also reacted sympathetically 
although our tests showed that there were 
no significant changes to prices. 
CONCLUSION
Analysing theory-relevant tax effects on tax-
exempt countries such as Oman and Saudi 
Arabia provided a clean test situation with 
identical samples although both countries 
practised different tax laws. Foreign firms 
had corporate taxes while locally-owned 
firms were exmpt from corporate tax or 
only the foreign firms had a huge reduction 
in the tax rate after the reform. Further, 
unlike most modern economies where there 
is captial gains and dividend income taxes, 
both Oman and Saudi Arabia have zero 
capital gains and zero dividend taxes. Thus, 
a study of these two countries (there are a 
few more; see Aslam et al., 2014) with their 
unique tax environments is worthwhile in 
testing the taxation theories. However, these 
two countries are the ones with (Islamic) tax 
neutrality moving to modern tax policies 
whereas most other countries have personal 
income taxes, which is absent in Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. This is the motivation for 
the study to test the theory in a much more 
ideal environment than is possible in any 
other markets. 
A further motivation is much more 
general in nature and is relevant for the 
study of Islamic capital market behaviour. 
Islamic countries rely very little, historically, 
on corporate, income, capital gains and 
dividend taxation. This is not the case for 
Islamic countries that came under colonial 
rule, when the colonisers introduced all 
sorts of taxes, ignoring the centuries-old tax 
neutrality policy practised there previously. 
Further, most resource-endowed Islamic 
countries tended to rely on revenues other 
than tax to meet government expenses. We 
characterise such Islamic taxation regimes 
as “tax-neutrality regimes” in comparison 
with the countries with a multitude of taxes 
because these countries preserved the pre-
1903 tax environment, during which time 
almost the whole world relied upon excise 
tax, land tax and wealth tax (and  a few 
non-income related taxes) for revenue. It 
was in 1903 that, for the first time, a new 
form of taxation, the corporate tax, was 
introduced by the US government: in that 
year the rate was set at 3 % of the pre-tax 
corporate income.  
Our attempt in this paper is to reveal 
how taxation policies away from a tax-
neutrality environment may affect stock 
price behaviour using the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) and Elton and Gruber (1970) 
theories on taxation. The announcement 
effect of tax reduction in Oman and Saudi 
Arabia on foreign firms appeared to serve 
as good news. The abnormal return to this 
event was a large increase in stock prices 
around the time of the tax reduction event 
in both countries. These findings were 
strong enough to confirm that in a controlled 
environment, announcement effects are quite 
clear and non-controversial. These results 
are consistent with the Miller-Modigliani 
prediction that a lowering of tax would 
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increase cash flow to the shareholders, and 
hence the value of the firms would increase. 
Further, to test robustness, we tested 
whether the price-to-dividend drop ratio on 
the ex-dvidend days were as per the Elton-
Gruber Model. Robustness testing was also 
done using the Bell-Jenkinson Model. The 
results showed that after winsorising the 
observations for outliers, the price drop 
ratio was exactly equal to 1.00 as tested 
using t-tests. This was so for both Oman 
and Saudi Arabia, two economies that have 
yet to introduce capital gains and dividend 
taxation.  
Tests carried out using US, Malaysia 
and Singapore data on the days of tax law 
changes for dividend tax rates have shown 
results consistent with the two theories 
as well (Aslam et al., 2012; Aslam et al., 
2014). Taken together, these findings in 
this paper using data from Oman and Saudi 
Arabia would suggest that both stock market 
reactions to tax law changes (in these cases 
only corporate tax rate reductions) are 
consistent with the theory predictions: (i) 
there should be no price drop if the capital 
gains and dividend tax rates are zero; and (ii) 
reductions in corporate tax rates constitute 
as good news, so the stock prices must 
increase from anticipated increases in cash 
flow to shareholders of foreign firms in both 
countries tested.  
Our results have some caveats. We 
mentioned that there were serious outlier 
problems, which we fixed by robust 
statistical procedures. The trading intensity 
was not very high in Oman, which may have 
introduced errors in the results. However, 
we noted that trading was quite brisk at the 
times of dividend payments (ex-dates) and 
when the law was passed into effect. There 
are other ways of testing the tax effect, 
although we relied upon the more widely 
used tests. Finally, these results should be 
further corroborated in future when more 
observations and possible tax law changes 
take place in tax-neutrality countries. There 
are 56 majority-Muslim countries, and a 
number of them still practice tax neutrality. 
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